Siin väga kirglik vaidlus käis.
Valgustage mind ka.
Mis värk selle madratsiga muidu on?
Et kui see oli sinna sihilikult topitud VS ei olnud topitud, et sellest järeldub mis? ja selletõttu võis toimuda/juhtuda mis? Või lihtsalt see teema, et kuna võib ka olla, et "tihendamiseks topiti rambi vahele madrats", siis see näitab, et tihendid lekkisid?
Seda, et visiiri ja rambi tihendid lekkisid, see on ju vist tänaseks juba nagu üldteada?
Saksa GGE "estoniaferrydisaster.net" lehel on nt.
Tsiteeri:
February 1994
On 2 February Börje Stenström sent his revised "Assumed Sequence of Events" with illustrating drawings - see Enclosure 38.1.462 - which repeated his earlier expressed thoughts.
By fax of 7 February Stenström requested the following:
....
3. Damage to rubber seals. As far as we understand, the heavy stem post on front of the visor rests against the fixed continuation on the stem/bulbous vow. This determines the vertical position of the visor in closed position and any change of the steel work at the rubber seals would not change the vertical position of the visor. In checking with inspectors who had been onboard shortly before the accident there had been no signs of changes to the rubber seal installation."
....
The hypothetical scenario of the JAIC had, however, serious weaknesses and some of them became very apparent at the meeting. These were mainly:
.....
(d) the apparent fact that visor seals were missing/damaged and the visor had been full of water to the outside level at sea with (then) unknown consequences.
Being so sure about their scenario the Finns for example agreed to the visor condition as explained under (d) above, while Stenström and the Estonians smelled trouble and were reluctant. In any event, Karppinen and Rahka fully agreed that the visor had always been full of water at sea, however later with-drew from this admission completely, when they realised what consequences water in the visor had in combination with a damaged bow ramp: water on the car deck.
....
In the course of the following weeks and the ongoing exchange of views and information Stenström admitted that his Part-Report was wrong in some respects, however, when it came to water in the visor, which evidently had been there, he was not prepared to give in. After this 'Group of Experts' had written, on 16 June:
"As to water in the visor which was flowing out once the vessel had reduced speed and the bow-wave became smaller we do not mean the crewmen of the pilot boat, but some Stockholm pilots who have observed the above, and they are not talking about just 150 litres. On the other hand the fact that at sea the inside of the visor was filled up to outside level with water due to poor or missing rubberseals was admitted by Ulf Hobro at our discussion in your presence mid February."
Stenström replied already on 22 June:
"I think there is nobody claiming that the space inside the visor was dry. It is not even required to be watertight by their rules. In a seaway water will be pushed in through any leaking seals at a higher rate than it would flow out when the bow rises out of the water and some water may have been there in bad weather. Please consider, how-ever, that the ramp seals were probably not 100 per cent watertight either, in particular not at the lower edge due to some play in the hinges and the fact that one locking wedge had not found its way fully into its female part. Any steady level of water inside the visor should therefore undoubtedly leak past the ramp into the car deck area. The area was inspected regularly, even shortly before the accident, and there was no water in the ramp area. Have therefore difficulties in believing in the existence of any large amount of water in the visor that could have influenced the dynamics of the visor in a seaway."
https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/es ... pter38.htmTsiteeri:
In addition, this 'Group of Experts' had the opportunity to ask Ulf Hobro questions in the presence of JAIC on 17.02.95 in Stockholm, which revealed the following:
- With the exception of the unscheduled drydockings due to the leaking stern tube seals in March and April 1993, the vessel under the management of N&T was only once at the Yard and in drydock, i.e. in January 1994 in Turku, when the stabilisers were installed and the ice paint was touched up the last time.
- At that time the B.V. surveyor Anders Wirstam carried out a Load Line Survey, which normally should have included the rubber packings of the visor.
Note: At that time Ulf Hobro knew very well from the specification of the previous crew that they had asked for a renewal of 15 m of rubber packing in way of the visor, which was never carried out.
- This was said to be the last time that Ulf Hobro had been inside the closed visor near the Atlantic lock. There were smaller leakages of the hydraulic cylinders of the Atlantic lock and the side locks as well as the bow ramp, which were said to be normal according to him.
https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/es ... t/12.5.htmJAIC Lõpparuande lisa nr.10
Manus:
1993 Wasa King tööd (JAIC Lisa 10)a.png [ 44.95 KB | Vaadatud 1388 korda ]
Manus:
1993 Wasa King tööd (JAIC Lisa 10).png [ 103.1 KB | Vaadatud 1388 korda ]
"Leivo komisjoni" protokoll nr.39
A.Veskimets:
Tehti märkus, et vaja on tihendeid vahetadaManus:
Veskimets aparellitihendid.png [ 66.16 KB | Vaadatud 1388 korda ]
Report of Inspection in Accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
27.09.1994
1284 Bow door packing damage
http://privat.bahnhof.se/wb576311/factg ... ryeng.html